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The success or failure of a disease control strategy can be
significantly affected by the behaviour of individual agents
involved, influencing the effectiveness of disease control,
its cost and sustainability. This behaviour has rarely been
considered in agricultural systems, where there is significant
opportunity for impact. Efforts to increase the adoption of
control while decreasing oscillations in adoption and yield,
particularly through the administration of subsidies, could
increase the effectiveness of interventions. We study individual
behaviour for the deployment of clean seed systems to control
cassava brown streak disease in East Africa, noting that high
disease pressure is important to stimulate grower demand of
the control strategy. We show that it is not necessary to invest
heavily in formal promotional or educational campaigns, as
word-of-mouth is often sufficient to endorse the system. At the
same time, for improved planting material to have an impact
on increasing yields, it needs to be of a sufficient standard to
restrict epidemic spread significantly. Finally, even a simple
subsidy of clean planting material may be effective in disease
control, as well as reducing oscillations in adoption, as long as
it reaches a range of different users every season.
1. Background
The adoption of a costly control strategy for disease can be
viewed as a public goods problem, and has been studied in
many systems, particularly for vaccination (e.g. [1]; for a review,
see [2]). Oscillations in adoption of the control strategy are
often observed; waves of infection and subsequent adoption
are followed by a decrease in adoption as infection declines
and control is deemed too costly in the absence, followed by
a resurgence, of infection (e.g. [3,4]). Cost thresholds, above
which adoption decreases dramatically as very few individuals
2017 The Authors. Published by the Royal Society under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution License http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/, which permits unrestricted
use, provided the original author and source are credited.
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apply the control, may also reduce the success of a disease control strategy for structured populations [1].
The economic and social consequences of this instability may make control strategies unsuitable or
unsustainable, as practitioners and businesses fail to cope with constant changes in demand. It is
therefore important to integrate considerations of grower behaviour with those of disease to determine
policy (e.g. [5,6]). Such integration has seldom been done for agriculture (although see [4,7]), but which
could benefit greatly from the increased stability and savings incurred.
A seed system distributes fresh (disease-free and high yielding), improved (resistant or tolerant of
disease) planting material (‘clean seed’) to growers to reduce crop losses. These systems are frequently
used as a control measure for disease. Use of clean planting material reduces disease within a field, but
to reduce reinfection from neighbouring fields several users in an area are required to act collectively.
However, non-participating growers may also obtain herd immunity (whereby high levels of control in
the population decrease disease to such an extent that even growers failing to control for the disease are
protected by a general reduction in inoculum pressure from neighbours’ fields) (e.g. [4]). The increased
costs of clean seed inhibit adoption. Growers are then likely to choose what they perceive to be the
most economical approach [4]. Additionally, lack of knowledge about the disease (its presence and
dispersal mechanisms), a preference for local landraces (due to issues such as trust in their quality
and taste), or a lack of access (reduced availability and quality of planting material, or the financial
means to purchase clean seed) may reduce adoption (e.g. [8–10]). Accordingly, we want to know how
to increase the adoption of planting material from these seed systems (Q1), how to avoid potential
pitfalls such as oscillations in adoption (Q2) and how best to implement active interventions through
subsidies (Q3).
Cassava, a key tuberous root crop for subsistence growers in sub-Saharan Africa, is an ideal system
for which to study these questions. Cassava brown streak disease is a viral disease found in East Africa
that reduces the yield of cassava through reduction in plant growth and necrosis of the tubers [11]
and it is increasingly becoming a problem across the region [12]. The viruses that cause the disease are
transmitted by a whitefly vector and may also be propagated through infected planting material [13–15],
suggesting that clean planting material may be beneficial for disease control. Indeed, a previous model
has examined the spread of the pathogen across a landscape and the effect of a seed system in reducing
spread [16]. However, that model [16] did not account for the effects of grower behaviour. Currently
only a few cassava growers use certified clean planting material due to low availability, in itself due to
low multiplication rates, bulkiness and perishability of cassava planting material ([8], although see [17]).
Growers are also unwilling or ignorant of the need to remove infected plants, and are constrained by the
costs such removal incurs due to decreased yields [14,18–21].
A previous project, the Great Lakes Cassava Initiative, piloted distribution of small quantities of
clean planting material. A current Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation-funded project and a separate
organization, the Mennonite Economic Development Associates, are aiming to establish large-scale seed
systems in Uganda and Tanzania. Here we investigate the effect of grower behaviour on such systems,
demonstrating how to increase their success and ensure their sustainability in terms of disease control.
2. Methods
The dynamics for plant and vector populations are taken from McQuaid et al. [16], and are outlined
below. These dynamics describe the dispersal of the pathogen across the district, through both trade and
the dispersal of viruliferous whitefly, as well as within individual fields through a mean-field model. The
use of a clean seed system affects infection in the planting material that a grower chooses to replant.
The grower behaviour model is layered on top of this model, where each grower makes a seasonal
decision on whether to adopt the control strategy. The effect of this decision then feeds back into the
dynamics of the disease itself. The decision is based on the relative ‘reward’ that the grower has observed
for each strategy (adoption or non-adoption of the control) in the previous season among either her
neighbours, trade partners or across the district as a whole, compared with the reward that she obtained
in her field. This reward is a combination of the total yield obtained and the costs incurred in purchasing
planting material. We outline the model below, which is simulated in Matlab, where further details of the
disease dynamics model can be found in McQuaid et al. [16]. We investigate the sensitivity of the model
to the cultural setting (the nature of farming and trading) and grower behaviour, with a discussion of
the disease model to be found in McQuaid et al. [16], noting that in the absence of a grower behaviour
model the system tends towards a steady state containing both infected and susceptible plants, while
in the absence of control the disease becomes ubiquitous. We vary parameters that describe the three
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different components of the system: the farming system and disease presence in the area, the clean seed
material and how it is introduced, and the grower behaviour in response to this introduction. In this way
we can compare the outcomes we might expect in different areas with different seed systems, evaluating
the influence that grower behaviour has on our results
2.1. Population dynamics
2.1.1. Within season
For each field i we consider uninfected (Si), latently infected (Li) and infectious and symptomatic
(Ii) plants and infectious vectors (Vi, with a total whitefly vector population given by W). For fields
i= 1 . . . N, we consider
dSi
dt
= μ
⎛
⎝1 − qi
N∑
j=1
τij
Cj
Pj
⎞
⎠− hSi − βpSiVi,
dLi
dt
= μqi
N∑
j=1
τij
Cj
Pj
+ βpSiVi − (h + γp)Li,
dIi
dt
= γpLi − (h + g)Ii
and
dVi
dt
= βv(Ii + R) · (W − Vi) − (λ + ω)Vi + m
⎛
⎝
N∑
j=1,j=i
δijVj − Vi
⎞
⎠ .
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
(2.1)
Plants are harvested at rate h and additional plants may be replanted at rate µ. Replanting occurs
with planting material obtained at the beginning of a season, where we consider commercial (seasonal
harvesting and replanting events), subsistence (continuous harvesting throughout the season with
annual replanting events) and casual (continuous harvesting and replanting with original material
throughout the season) growers.
Plants may additionally be infected through contact with viruliferous vectors, which infect uninfected
plants at density-dependent rate βp. Resistant plants are infected at a lower infection rate βp. Once
infected, latently infected plants progress to a fully infectious state at rate γ p, when they may be rogued
at rate g.
In terms of the vector, uninfected vectors (W −Vi) become infected at density-dependent rate βv
through contact with infectious plants in the same field or a reservoir host (at density R). The vector loses
this infectivity at rate λ, and dies at rate ω. Vector between-field dispersal, where we assume emigration
and immigration rates are the same, occurs at rate m. We assume this dispersal is constant for emigration,
while for immigration into field i we sum dispersal of infectious vectors from each field j to field i. This
is given for Euclidean distance dij between the centres of the pair of fields by the probability density
dispersal function δij = (Aα2/2π )e−αdij , for attractive area A (where the dispersal probability at every
point in the field is equal) and mean distance of dispersal 1/α.
2.1.2. Between seasons
Replanting occurs with planting material obtained either from the grower’s own field (qi = 1, with
probability bc if not using a clean seed system) or through trade with the owner of another field (qi = 1,
with probability 1 − bc if not using a clean seed system), or from a clean seed system (qi = 0). If the former,
the proportion of cuttings in field i obtained from every field j is given by τ ij, so that
∑N
j=1 τij = 1. For trade
with neighbouring fields, a grower at field i trades with a number of neighbours up to a given maximum
bs, where grower j is chosen with probability ρij = re−dij/dmax for dmax the maximum distance between
any two fields and random, uniformly selected variable r ∈ [0, 1]. This latter variable r adds stochasticity
to the trade process, ensuring that growers do not simply trade with their nearest neighbours. Growers
may remain loyal to the same suppliers each season, or may alter suppliers, where a given number of
growers bl across the system are loyal. We note that for each pair of fields i and j, the probability of trade
ρij is unrelated to the quantity of trade τ ij, although τ ij > 0 if and only if ρij > 0. The level of infection
in the planting material obtained from field j is determined by Pj =
∫300
0 h(Sj + ηLj) dt + (Sj + ηLj)|300
and Cj =
∫300
0 h((1 − η)Lj + Ij) dt + ((1 − η)Lj + Ij)|300, the total number of uninfected and infected plants
respectively harvested from field j in the previous (300 day) season, either during the season at rate h or at
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the end of the season where all remaining plants are harvested. These are constant within a season, based
on the dynamics of the previous season, but vary between seasons. Latently infected harvested plants
may also have sufficiently low viral load as to undergo reversion at rate η, while infectious plants may
be successfully identified as such and discarded with likelihood given by cutting selection parameter
ξ . In this way, the proportion of infected cuttings replanted depends on whether or not the grower is
using planting material directly obtained through a clean seed system, and the incidence of infection in
planting material that the grower has collected both from her own and her neighbour’s fields.
2.2. Grower behaviour
2.2.1. Between seasons
The epidemiological model is continuous within a fixed duration season, with an annual discrete
complete harvesting and replanting event. The behavioural model and the epidemiological model are
then linked through an annual decision by the growers on whether or not to alter their choice of
replanting strategy (affecting qi above), based on the reward that each strategy is perceived to produce.
This follows the methods of Milne et al. [4]. A detailed analysis of the effect of parameter qi is included
in McQuaid et al. [16]; in essence, as would be expected when clean seed is used there is less disease in
a field. The incidence across the region then quickly equilibrates, where the choice of growers that use
clean seed (i.e. for whom qi = 1) affects the equilibrium disease level. In particular, the spatial clustering
of users affects results, as does the consistency of those users between seasons.
Decision-making for a grower takes place at the beginning of every season, and is therefore not
concurrent to the disease spread model. A grower changes strategy with probability
σ = 1 − e−θ(φA−φF+κ) when φA − φF + κ > 0
and ψ otherwise.
(2.2)
Here θ measures the responsiveness of the grower to loss, while φF is the reward that the grower obtained
in the previous season and φA is the reward that the grower perceived among those of her farmer’s
group, trade partners or the general population who used the alternative strategy. Parameter κ measures
the likelihood of a grower to conform to the strategy of their neighbours (κ > 0) or to stubbornly persist
with their own strategy (κ < 0), in either case regardless of the actual reward both strategies offer (see
(2.1)). We also note that there is a probability of switching strategy even when the alternative results
in lower levels of reward, given by contrariness ψ , simulating irrational choices by growers as well as
accounting for ignorance of the cause of the disease.
Reward is measured, for strategy s (either using a clean seed system or not), as
φs = Ysp − cs, (2.3)
where Ys is the proportion of yield that a grower using that strategy obtained in the previous season, p is
the selling price of the crop that could have been obtained from an uninfected field, and cs is the cost that
using the strategy incurs. Yield, given by the harvest taken over the season including the final harvest,
is Y = ∫3000 h(Sj + Lj + ιIj) dt + (Sj + Lj + ιIj)|300/
∫300
0 h(Sj + Lj + Ij) dt + (Sj + Lj + Ij)|300, where the yield
of latently infected plants is unaffected by disease, while only a proportion (ι) of infectious plants are
usable. Tolerant plants have a higher useable portion ι. All fields are assumed to be identical in size and
are therefore comparable, where growers receive information on relative yields from their farmers group
of neighbouring growers with probability rl, their trade suppliers with probability rt or across the district
as a whole through extension workers with probability rd.
We initially presume that 70% of fields are infected with approximately 100% incidence (T. Alicai, 11
May 2015, personal communication) and 10% of growers use the clean seed system. See table 1 for default
parameter values and box 1 for relevant terminology, where more details on parameter estimation may
be found in McQuaid et al. [16].
3. Results
3.1. How to increase use of a clean seed system
Complete adoption of clean planting material by the entire grower population is never reached with our
default parameter set (figure 1), as approaching ubiquity of adoption reduces disease to such an extent
as to ensure clean planting material is unnecessary. However, if external disease pressure and whitefly
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Box 1. Grower behaviour terminology.
Conformism— the tendency to adopt the strategy of one’s neighbours irrespective of the rewards
different strategies display.
Stubbornness— opposite of conformism, the tendency to stick with one’s current strategy irrespective
of the reward displayed.
Responsiveness— the tendency to change strategies when there is only a small change in rewards.
Contrariness— the tendency to adopt a strategy that displays less reward than the alternative.
Table 1. Model parameters and default values. For simplicity, we assume that there is one growing season of 300 days per year, ignoring
the initial twomonths of the seasonwhen there is no foliage andwhitefly cannot transmit the pathogen, althoughwe note that in reality
there may be some transmission between 1 and 2 months. We assume that the majority of growers are subsistence farmers, as is often
the case. This implies that fields are harvested continuously at a constant rate over a period of months during the season, commencing
after the first two months, with one replanting event at the start of each season (μ= 0, h> 0). The size of a cassava field is taken
to be 1.5 hectares (e.g. [22]), and we presume an increase in affinity for whitefly of cassava fields over other areas. We presume that
whitefly are a third again as likely to land on a cassava field as on a bare patch of land. We base the cassava field density of our model
on the area of cassava harvested in Nakasongola district, Uganda (10 000 hectares, http://kids.fao.org/agromaps/), and hence consider
6000 cassava fields. Whitefly migration is calculated from Riis & Nachman [23], using the total population to find the immigration rate
at equilibrium, which we presume to be identical to emigration. To simulate the dispersal of the vector we use data from Isaacs & Byrne
[24] and Byrne et al. [25] for the dispersal of the sweet potato whitefly (on average, 50–700 m). We do not include the long-distance
dispersal of whitefly that Byrne et al. [25] observe in a second peak of migration, as this is not consistent with the exponential dispersal
kernel that we have assumed. More importantly, however, whitefly may not remain infectious, or even survive, for the duration of these
journeys [15,26,27]. SeeMcQuaid et al. [16] for further details. For harvesting and replanting, one example of themaximumpotential yield
in Uganda is UGX 1 200 000, while the cost to growers using certified clean plantingmaterial is UGX 300 000 compared to UGX 0 for those
that obtain planting material through the recycling of cuttings. It is the ratio of the maximum potential yield to the cost of technology
that is important, which from the above is taken to be 1 : 0.25 : 0, although we vary this to consider other systems. We estimate the
responsiveness of growers to loss from the known adoption of certified seed and seed systems for other crops by growers in East Africa
(roughly 5–15%, see [28–31]) and the maximum potential benefit of using certified clean planting material (0.01–0.28). The latter is
calculated from equation (2.3) and the equilibrium yield (approx. 100% for users of the clean seed system, 47–74% for nonusers) from
equation (2.1) when 5–15% of growers dispersed across the landscape use the clean seed system, where the users vary each season.
Solving equation (2.2) using these values gives the range 0.18≤ θ ≤ 16.25, where we pick θ from this range. We choose stubbornness
κ to be of a similar order of magnitude, with a default value of zero. Contrariness ψ was chosen to be two orders of magnitude less
than σ , to represent its rarity, although we investigated values around this range. The unit ‘plants’ refers to the number of plants
in a field.
parameter description valuea source
crop agronomy
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
h harvesting rate 0.003 day−1 Jeger et al. [32]
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
µ replanting rate 0 plants day−1 see also van den Bosch et al. [33]
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
g roguing rate 0 day−1 —
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
N number of fields 1000 —
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
disease dynamics
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
βp infection rate of plant 0.007 vector−1 day−1 Mware et al. [34]
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
γ p disease progression rate in plant 0.035 day−1 Mware et al. [34] and Mohammed [35]
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
η reversion ratio 0 —
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
ξ cutting selection 0% —
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
βv virus acquisition rate for vector 0.007 plants day−1 Mware et al. [34]
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
λ rate of loss of disease by vector 1 day−1 Legg et al. [14] and Patil et al. [36]
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
R reservoir host density 0 —
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(Continued.)
6rsos.royalsocietypublishing.org
R.Soc.opensci.4:170721
................................................
Table 1. (Continued.)
parameter description valuea source
vector dynamics
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1/α mean vector dispersal distance 150 m Byrne [37] and Isaacs & Byrne [24]
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
W vector population 200 individuals Jeger et al. [32]
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
ω vector natural death rate 0.12 day−1 Jeger et al. [32]
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
m vector migration rate 0.04 day−1 Riis & Nachman [23]
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A attractive area of field 20 000 m2 —
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
trading behaviour
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
bc chance of a grower trading for planting
material
50% Njenga et al. [10] & Otim-Nape et al. [17]
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
bs maximum trading partners 3 Rohrbach & Kiala [31]
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
bl growers loyal to trading partners 0% —
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
grower behaviour
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
— farmer group size 15–30 growers A. Pariyo, 28 April 2014, personal
communication
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
rl , rt, rd probability of receiving information
from farmer group, trade partners,
extension worker (district scale)
40%, 40%, 20% see Apok [8]
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
θ responsiveness of growers 1.6 see table caption
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
κ conformity/stubbornness of growers 0 see table caption
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
ψ contrariness of growers 0.001 see table caption
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
cost
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
p relative selling price of yield of
uninfected field
1 T. Omara 2014, personal
communication
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
cclean, creuse relative cost of using clean planting
material, planting material recycled
through reuse or trade
0.25, 0 T. Omara 2014, personal
communication
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
ι usable percentage of infectious plant 30% e.g. Gondwe et al. [38] and Hillocks
et al. [39]
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
aCertain parameters included for generality in the model are set to zero to simplify testing of hypotheses.
numbers are particularly high, and the cost of clean planting material low, adoption can increase to very
high levels as clean planting material becomes both necessary and readily available. In the absence of
these factors, lower adoption, and oscillations in the adoption over time, are likely to occur. We examine
a range of results, focusing on non-monotonic relationships here (figure 2). A summary of the effect of
individual parameter values on adoption, yield and oscillations in both is outlined in table 2.
Agronomic system: the degree of coordination and synchronization in planting and harvesting affects
adoption and disease levels. Commercial systems (involving seasonal planting and harvesting) are likely
to see higher levels of adoption than casual or subsistence systems (figure 3a,b), as seasonal harvesting
ensures that more plants are in the field for longer, increasing their chances of infection. If there are high
levels of trade in a region (a reasonable likelihood of trade with many, varying suppliers) we are likely
to see an increase in adoption and a decrease in yields as the pathogen is able to spread more rapidly
resulting in increased disease (figures 3c–e and 4c–e).
Disease pressure: areas with increased overall disease pressure are likely to incur lower yields and
higher adoption. However, high initial disease pressure only affects the yield and adoption in the short
term (figures 3f and 4f ), after which disease pressure and therefore adoption equilibrate to similar levels
regardless of the initial disease pressure. Additionally, the adoption varies to compensate for whitefly
numbers, resulting in little change to yield (figures 3g and 4g). The presence of an alternative, reservoir
host also only increases adoption (due to increased disease) up to a given density, above which adoption
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Figure 1. Low adoption of clean planting material over time in a system where there is no external disease pressure, reasonably high
whitefly numbers and clean planting material is expensive (200 whitefly per plant, planting material cost= 1/4 maximum potential
yield, solid grey line). External disease pressure (simulated through the immigration of infected whitefly from external sources at ratem
or the introduction of a reservoir infected host at density 0.1, dotted line), higher whitefly numbers (500 whitefly per plant, dot-dashed
line) or a low cost to clean planting material (planting material cost= 1/10 maximum potential yield, dashed line) alone are insufficient
to promote high adoption. However, when combined, adoption approaches 100% (black line).
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Figure 2. Change in average adoption (solid line) and yield (dashed line)with (a) density of a reservoir host, (b) likelihood of information
being obtained at a regional scale, and (c) stubbornness of growers to change over 25 seasons.
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Table 2. Change in dynamics for increasing parameter values. Parameter values are grouped into those describing the agronomic system,
the disease pressure, the clean planting material, the actions of growers and their behaviour. Varying these parameters affects the
adoption of clean planting material and the percentage yield obtained, averaged over a period of 25 seasons, as well as the amplitude
and frequency of oscillations and their dampening in adoption and yield. Increasing parameter values may increase or decrease these
results monotonically (↗ or↘ respectively), have no effect at all (→) or have a non-monotonic effect (↗↘,↘↗ or↘↗↘).
Note that in all cases oscillations in adoption and yield are similarly affected by changes in parameter values.
parameter adoption yield dampening amplitude frequency
casual → → → → →
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
commercial ↗ → ↘ ↗ ↗
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
likelihood of trading → ↘ ↘ ↗ ↗
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
number of suppliers ↗ → ↘ ↗ ↗
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
disloyalty to suppliers ↗ ↘ ↘ ↗ ↗
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
initial disease pressure → → → ↗ ↘
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
number of whitefly ↗ → ↗ ↘ ↗
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
reservoir host ↗↘ ↘ ↗ ↘ ↘
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
cost of material ↘ ↘ ↗ ↘ ↗
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
tolerance of material ↘ ↗ ↗ ↘ ↘
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
resistance of material ↘ ↗ ↗ ↘ ↘
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
cleanliness of material ↘ ↗ ↘ ↗ ↘
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
roguing ↘ ↗ ↗ ↘ ↘
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
cutting selection ↘ ↗ ↗ ↘ ↘
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
information sources ↗ ↗ ↘↗ ↗ ↗
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
responsiveness ↘ ↗ ↘↗ ↘ ↗
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
stubbornness ↘↗↘ ↘↗↘ ↘↗ ↗↘ ↘
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
contrariness ↗ ↗ ↗ ↘ ↘
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
declines as the reservoir provides too large a source of infection for effective control to be worthwhile
(figures 2a and 3h).
Clean planting material: costly clean planting material is less likely to be used as it begins to outweigh
the benefit of its use, so that disease increases and yields decline (figures 3i and 4i). On the other hand,
improved planting material, which is either tolerant or resistant and has low levels of infection, may
increase yield but with a subsequent decrease in adoption (figures 3j–l and 4j–l) as growers’ assessment
of disease risk declines. However, the planting material must be highly improved, or it may lead to very
little change in yield as the adoption varies to compensate. In such cases, an extreme reduction in disease
means that growers no longer see the need for clean planting material, allowing for disease persistence
and subsequent re-emergence.
Grower activity: practices that remove infected plants (roguing and selection) reduce adoption as
they provide an alternative method of disease reduction, but have no effect on yields unless the rate
is high enough to near-eradicate the disease, when yields rapidly increase (figures 3m–o and 4m–o). If
growers are able to access information from a number of sources (i.e. have an increased likelihood of
obtaining regional-level information) both adoption and yield increase (figures 3o and 4o) as growers
across the region are able to assess the threat of disease. However, the increase in both adoption and
yield is primarily noticeable for very low levels of regional information, above which there is less effect
(figure 2b); there needs to be some access to global information, so that assessment of disease risk and
clean planting material use is not confined to affected areas only, but this need not be ubiquitous as local
dynamics are still important in determining risk of infection.
Grower behaviour: a high degree of responsiveness means that growers react quickly to the presence
of disease, slowing disease dispersal and therefore reducing the need for adoption of clean planting
material and increasing the yield (figures 3p and 4p). In terms of adoption, there is an optimum level
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Figure 3. Effect of parameter changes on oscillations in adoption compared to the default parameter set (dotted line). Results show
adoption for (a) a casual or (b) a commercial system, and for an increasing (solid line) or decreasing (dashed line) parameter values for (c)
the likelihood of trade occurring, (d) the number of suppliers, (e) the number of growers disloyal to suppliers, (f ) the initial incidence of
disease, (g) the number ofwhiteflyper plant, (h) the density of a reservoir host, (i) the cost of plantingmaterial, (j) the tolerance to disease
of the plantingmaterial, (k) the resistance to disease of the plantingmaterial, (l) the incidence of disease in the plantingmaterial, (m) the
rate of roguing, (n) the likelihood of successfully selecting out infectious cuttings, (o) the likelihood of growers obtaining regional-scale
information, (p) the responsiveness of growers, (q) the stubbornness of growers or (r) the contrariness of growers.
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Figure 4. (a–r) Effect of parameter changes on oscillations in yield compared to the default parameter set (dotted line) as in figure 3.
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of stubbornness of growers; above and below this optimum the adoption decreases, although with an
additional increase in adoption again as growers begin to conform (figure 2c). This represents the balance
in rapidity of response; if growers are too stubborn the majority will persist with their current strategy
of non-engagement with clean planting material, while if they conform too readily the majority will
quickly take up clean planting material, but then just as rapidly abandon it until an equilibrium number
of users is reached. Yield, however, is highest for conforming growers, with a lower peak at a medium
level of stubbornness as growers are quicker to follow the example of their neighbours and use clean
planting material. Contrariness of growers increases both adoption and yield, as growers continue to use
the system when it is unnecessary (figures 3r and 4r).
3.2. How to reduce oscillations
We have chosen to present only a 25-year span here, as this is both more relatable for practitioners
and more realistic in terms of a period of interest. Increasing the simulation time does not change our
qualitative conclusions about what promotes oscillations (although quantitative differences exit).
Agronomic system: an abundance of commercial growers is likely to see increased oscillations
compared with a population comprised of casual or subsistence growers (figures 3a,b and 4a,b), as the
effect of clean planting material through replanting becomes seasonal rather than continuous. Higher
levels of trade result in more frequent, higher amplitude oscillations occurring as both the pathogen and
clean planting material are disseminated quickly through the region (figures 3c–e and 4c–e).
Disease pressure: the initial pressure has little effect on oscillations except to increase the amplitude
for very high initial incidence (figures 3f and 4f ), as the dynamics quickly account for the initial state.
However, consistent high disease pressure through high numbers of the vector or an alternative reservoir
host leads to low amplitude, dampening oscillations as there is always disease present, so always a need
for clean planting material (figures 3g,h and 4g,h).
Clean planting material: increasing the cost of clean planting material leads to reduced amplitude and
dampening of oscillations as very few growers use the system (figures 3i and 4i). In comparison, tolerant
or resistant planting material may dampen oscillations, decreasing the frequency and amplitude as plants
are less affected by the disease (figures 3j,k and 4j,k). In contrast, infection in planting material leads to
frequent, low amplitude oscillations with significant dampening, due (as with the presence of a reservoir
host discussed above) to the constant presence of disease (figures 3l and 4l).
Grower activity: practices removing infected plants also dampen oscillations, lowering the amplitude
and frequency (figures 3m,n and 4m,n) as disease is removed from the region through other means than
clean planting material. However, if the disease is not completely eradicated it may return rapidly as
control is no longer practiced. At the same time, very high or very low average numbers of information
sources (due to high or low likelihood of obtaining regional level information) lead to dampening
of oscillations (figures 3o and 4o), where growers make decisions based on either regional dynamics
(dampening oscillations due to the interactions of different groups of growers) or very local dynamics
(dampening oscillations as local trends have no opportunity to spread).
Grower behaviour: high or low responsiveness of growers leads to dampening of oscillations in
adoption and yield; in the case of high responsiveness, growers react quickly to change before large
population-wide trends develop, while for low responsiveness growers respond much slower to change
than the disease dynamics, allowing for equilibration in the infection levels (figures 3p and 4p). Similarly,
a high frequency of highly stubborn or conforming growers dampens oscillations (figures 3q and 4q).
Contrariness also dampens oscillations in adoption and yield (figures 3r and 4r) as growers fail to
respond to oscillations in disease dynamics.
3.3. How to implement an intervention
A subsidy of free clean planting material to a given group of growers increases adoption (figure 5) as
more growers are exposed to the benefits of the material, and has the most effect if distributed to varying
recipients as suggested previously (see [16]). This is likely because the majority of growers in the region
are repeat users, using the system for more than one season, so any overlap in past and present recipients
of a subsidy is wasteful. Indeed, varying the recipients of the subsidy has the additional incentive of
dampening oscillations in both yield and adoption with a small but consistent effect. However, any
clustering of these recipients makes very little difference to adoption (not shown), contrary to previous
findings (see [16]).
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Figure 5. Different approaches to distributing subsidized clean planting material to 10% of growers for free, and the effect on adoption
in the population as a whole. Distribution occurs at random throughout the district, either to different growers each season (black solid
line) or to the same growers each season (black dashed line), compared to a case with no subsidy (grey dotted line). Results are similar if
distribution focuses on communities of growers, as opposed to dispersed individuals.
4. Discussion
Most epidemic models do not account for grower behaviour explicitly: for some exploratory exceptions
see [4–6,40]. In this paper, we have built on a well-established framework for a parsimonious epidemic
model with dual sources of infection (via vectors and replanting) and introduced simple elaborations
that allowed us to gain insight into some of the consequences of grower choices on epidemic dynamics.
Future work will refine the socio-economic aspects of the model as more empirical data become available
to inform the choice of framework.
We note firstly that grower behaviour is, as expected, highly likely to impact disease spread through
the adoption of clean planting material [5] and we are unlikely ever to see complete disease prevention
(see [41]). Indeed, if external disease pressure or a reservoir host (although in reality this appears unlikely
to be important) is present at sufficiently high levels, the release of disease resistant clean planting
material may be necessary to control the disease at all. However, growers in areas with high disease
pressure are more likely to show interest in clean planting material, as we might expect (see [8]), which
allows for disease persistence in low pressure areas. Additionally, oscillations in adoption and yield
are highly likely, as witnessed in other agronomic systems ([4], and hearsay from varieties resistant to
cassava mosaic disease in Uganda at the turn of the century). In particular, areas with many commercial
plantings (rather than casual or subsistence growers) are highly likely to succumb to large oscillations
in adoption, even when differences in behaviour are not considered. One aspect not covered here is the
relative importance of the crop to grower, compared with their reliance on other crops, which will also
affect whether they are likely to consider disruptive management practices.
In terms of the planting material, competitively low pricing can significantly increase use; indeed,
there is a threshold (where the cost of planting material is equal to the minimum yield that can be
obtained from a fully infected field) above which growers are unlikely to use the planting material at
all. We assume that the cost of the planting material also implicitly includes a cost in terms of a reduction
in quality or desirability of the variety for growers, who may prefer local landraces. We note on the other
hand that seed companies in other agronomic systems often bundle a number of desirable traits together
(similar here to increasing the reward that using the clean seed system is perceived to give), as well as
varying the cost of planting material, in order to avoid oscillations in adoption, an aspect that is not
explicitly considered in the current analyses [4]. Planting material that is partially resistant will increase
yields, but in reality may require replenishment as these yields decline with repeated recycling, an aspect
we do not consider here. On the other hand, planting material that is tolerant will maintain high yields,
but will also result in a build-up in inoculum pressure that may affect other varieties. However, infection
in planting material will, economically at least, not dissuade growers from its use, although work on
opinion dynamics by A. Milne (personal communication, 12 May 2016) suggests that trust in a control
strategy is vital for its success.
At the same time, over-investment in the spread of information on success of the clean seed system
appears to be unnecessary (see also [7], but see [21]); word of mouth between growers may often be
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sufficient, with little additional reward in terms of yield for any increase in information distribution.
Reducing the dissemination of information may also slow grower reactions to change, decreasing
oscillations (see also [4]). This implies that an optimal amount of information disseminated will lead
to high adoption and yield, but with a low chance of oscillations occurring.
Education, influencing grower behaviour, is also important (e.g. [21]). Education affects
responsiveness and conformity, as well as potentially improving agronomic practices and affecting
the management of additional pests and diseases not considered here. Responsiveness among growers
reduces adoption while increasing yield, and also dampens oscillations (see also [4]). However, so does
very low responsiveness. Ideally, growers should assess their particular situation individually (i.e. not
be too conformist, although if conformism is particularly high that can also increase adoption) but
also be reasonable (not be too stubborn), where it may be key to stress the folly of hasty decisions
and the wisdom of a certain degree of persistence (ensuring some level of stubbornness, see also [4]).
However, the behaviour described above may also lead to oscillations. This may reflect the ‘prisoner’s
dilemma’ faced by growers undertaking potentially costly action to benefit the community. Surprisingly,
contrariness of growers leads to high adoption with dampened oscillations, as growers persist with an
unnecessary strategy.
5. Conclusion
Our model identifies five key aspects to consider when implementing a clean seed control strategy.
Importantly, it has been necessary to consider grower behaviour here; in the absence of grower choice
the model tends towards stable steady states (see also [16]). However, when we allow for the reaction of
growers to this, cycles in adoption and incidence can result. It is vital to bear these cycles in mind when
planning disease control.
Firstly, high disease pressure and aspects that lead to this are likely to encourage individuals to
engage with a control strategy. However, if disease pressure is too high or persistent, individuals may
be discouraged from engagement as control has little effect. Aspects that lead to rapid dispersal of the
pathogen may also lead to oscillations in engagement, although consistent disease pressure dampens
these oscillations as there is a constant demand for control.
Secondly, improvements in clean planting material and field management can be effective in reducing
disease, although also decreasing engagement as control is no longer necessary (which may in turn be
useful if only a limited supply of clean planting material is available). However, these improvements
must be of a sufficient standard or they risk leading to near but not complete control of disease,
at which point individuals cease to engage with the control strategy allowing for re-emergence of
the disease.
Thirdly, high levels of information need not be disseminated in order to have an effect on engagement,
although there must be some chance of individuals gaining a broad view of disease risk. If this chance is
high, but not guaranteed, it may lead to oscillations in engagement.
Fourthly, education of individuals is effective in promoting rapid response to changes in disease
pressure, although if this response is not sufficiently rapid it may also promote oscillations in engagement
and disease. However, we should not be discouraged by a certain degree of stubbornness or contrariness
in the population, which may increase engagement over time as well as dampening oscillations in this.
Finally, the introduction of some level of ‘free’ control can have a marked positive effect on both
engagement and disease reduction. This control need not be associated with a complex, coordinated
approach to achieve high impact. However, in order to have maximum effect, as well as to dampen
oscillations in engagement, it is important that the control reach different individuals over time, rather
than the same select group consistently.
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